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Abstract
Facial recognition and verification is a widely used bio-
metric technology in security system. Unfortunately,
face biometrics is vulnerable to spoofing attacks using
photographs or videos. In this paper, we present an
anisotropic diffusion-based kernel matrix model (AD-
KMM) for face liveness detection to prevent face spoofing
attacks. We use the anisotropic diffusion to enhance the
edges and boundary locations of a face image, and the ker-
nel matrix model to extract face image features which we
call the diffusion-kernel (D-K) features. The D-K features
reflect the inner correlation of the face image sequence.
We introduce convolution neural networks to extract the
deep features, and then, employ a generalized multiple
kernel learning method to fuse the D-K features and the
deep features to achieve better performance. Our exper-
imental evaluation on the two publicly available datasets
shows that the proposed method outperforms the state-of-
art face liveness detection methods.
1 Introduction
Face recognition and verification [21, 23] has become the
most popular technology in high-level security systems
due to the natural, intuitive, and less human-invasive face
biometrics. Unfortunately, face biometrics is vulnerable
to spoofing attacks using photographs or videos of the
actual user. Attackers can attempt to hack the security
system by using printed photos, mimic masks, or screen-
shots, and they can also use the captured or downloaded
video sequences containing facial gestures like eye blink-
ing of the valid user to invade the security system. In or-
der to mitigate this problem, many researchers have made
much effort to face liveness detection based on image
quality [24, 29], spectrum [10, 30], and motion informa-
tion like eye blinking [18], mouth movement [11], and
head pose [3]. Recently, Diffusion methods have been ap-
plied to face liveness detection [9, 1], which can estimate
the difference in surface properties between live and fake
faces and achieve spectacular performance. However, it
still remains a big challenge to detect face liveness against
spoofing attacks.
In this paper, we present an anisotropic diffusion-based
kernel matrix model (ADKMM) for face liveness detec-
tion to prevent face spoofing attacks. The ADKMM can
accurately estimate the difference in surface properties
and inner correlation between live and fake face images.
Figure 1 illustrates the overview of our method. The
anisotropic diffusion is used to enhance the edges and
boundary locations of a face image sequence, and the
kernel matrix model is used to extract face features from
the sequence which reflect the inner correlation of the se-
quence. We call these features the diffusion-kernel (D-
K) features. To achieve better performance against the
spoofing attack, we also extract the deep features using
deep convolution neural networks, and then utilize a gen-
eralized multiple kernel learning method to fuse the D-
K features and the deep features. The deep features can
work well with D-K features by providing complemen-
tary information. Synthetical considering these two kinds
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
02
69
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
0 J
ul 
20
17
Input video/images 
Anisotropic 
Diffusion Kernel Matrix Model
Convolution 
Neural Network
Anisotropic Diffusion-based Kernel Matrix Model ( ADKMM )
GMKL
D-K features
deep features
Figure 1: An illustration of the proposed method. We diffuse the input video or images by anisotropic diffusion
method first, next we use kernel matrix model to extract the diffusion-kernel (D-K) features. Then, we extract deep
features from the diffused images by deep convolution neural networks. Finally, the D-K features and deep features are
fused by a generalized multiple kernel learning (GMKL) method for face liveness detection to prevent face spoofing
attacks.
of feature relationships, we can capture the differences ef-
fectively in both sides of illumination characteristics and
inner correlation of face images. The experimental re-
sults on various publicly available datasets demonstrate
that our method provides a reliable performance of face
liveness detection.
The main contributions of this paper can be summa-
rized as follows:
•We present an anisotropic diffusion-based kernel ma-
trix model (ADKMM) that can accurately estimate the
difference in surface properties and inner correlation be-
tween live and fake face images to extract diffusion-kernel
(D-K) features for face liveness detection.
• We utilize a generalized multiple kernel learning
method to fuse the D-K features and the deep features ex-
tracted by deep convolution neural networks to get better
performance against the spoofing attack.
• Our method achieves an impressive accuracy on the
publicly available datasets and outperforms the state-of-
art face liveness detection methods.
2 Related Work
Many methods of face liveness detection are based on the
analysis of a single image. These methods assume that
fake faces tend to lose more information by the imaging
system and thus come into a lower quality image under the
same capturing condition. Li et al. [15] proposed to ana-
lyze the coefficients of Fourier transform since the reflec-
tions of light on 2D and 3D surfaces result in different fre-
quency distributions. For example, fake faces are mostly
captured twice by the camera, so their high-frequency
components are different with those of real faces. Zhang
et al. [29] attempted to extract frequency information us-
ing multiple DoG filters to detect the liveness of the cap-
tured face image. Tan et al. [24] and Peixoto et al. [19]
combined the DoG filter and other models to extract ef-
ficient features from the input image to improve the live-
ness detection performance. Maatta et al. [16] extracted
the micro texture of input image using the multi-scale lo-
cal binary pattern (LBP). Based on these micro textures,
they used SVM classifier to detect the face liveness. Kim
et al. [9] calculated the diffusion speed of a single im-
age, then they used a local speed model to extract features
and input them into a linear SVM classifier to distinguish
the fake faces from real ones. Alotaibi et al. [1] used
nonlinear diffusion to detect edges in the input image and
utilized the diffused image to detect face liveness by using
convolution neural networks.
Motion-based approaches are another common class of
face liveness detection, which aim at detecting subcon-
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Figure 2: Examples of diffused images with different it-
eration numbers (L). (a), (b) and (c) are live face images,
(d), (e) and (f) are fake face images. (a) and (d) Original
images. (b) and (e) Diffused image with L = 5. (c) and
(f) Diffused image with L = 15.
scious response of a face. Given an image sequence,
these methods attempt to capture facial response like eye
blinking, mouth movement, and head pose, then exploit
spatial and temporal features. Pan et al. [18] detected
the eye blinking behavior using a unidirectional condi-
tional graphic framework. A discriminative measure of
eye states is also incorporated into the framework to de-
tect face liveness. Singh et al. [22] applied the haar clas-
sifier and distinguished the fake faces from the real ones
by detecting eye and mouth movements. Anjos et al. [2]
attempted to detect motion correlations between the users
head and the background regions obtained from the op-
tical flow that indicate a spoofing attack. Tirunagari et
al. [25] used the dynamic mode decomposition (DMD)
algorithm to capture face from the input video and ex-
tract dynamic visual information to detect the spoofing
attack. Bharadwaj et al. [5] proposed a novel method to
detect face liveness using the configuration LBP and mo-
tion estimaion to extract the facial features. Since multi-
ple input frames are required to track face, dynamic ap-
proaches usually cost more detection time and computing
resources. Besides, some dynamic methods require user
to follow some instructions which in the users experience
is inconvenient.
Different from existing methods, our work focus on
the the difference in surface properties and inner corre-
lation between live and fake face images. We present
an anisotropic diffusion-based kernel matrix model (AD-
KMM) for face liveness detection to prevent face spoofing
attacks. The anisotropic diffusion method helps to dis-
tinguish fake faces from real ones by diffusing the input
image to enhance the difference in illumination character-
istics. From these images, we can gain the depth informa-
tion and boundary locations of face images. The D-K fea-
tures extracted by kernel matrix model can significantly
reflect the inner correlation of the faces image sequences
and thus lead to a better classification.
3 Proposed Method
Our method uses the anisotropic diffusion to enhance the
edges and boundary locations of a face image, and the
kernel matrix model to extract the diffusion-kernel (D-K)
features. To achieve better performance against the spoof-
ing attacks, we extract the deep features by deep convo-
lution neural networks, and utilize a generalized multiple
kernel learning method to fuse the D-K features and the
deep features.
3.1 Anisotropic Diffusion
The anisotropic diffusion method is used to diffuse the in-
put video or images to enhance edge information. Some
examples of diffused images are shown in Figure 2. Con-
sider the anisotropic diffusion equation [20]
It = div(c(x, y, t)∇I) = c(x, y, t)∆I +∇c · ∇I, (1)
where the div represents the divergence operator, and∇ ,
∆ represent the gradient and Laplacian operators, respec-
tively. I0(x, y) is the original image and t is the variance
in Gaussian kernel G(x, y, t). It reduces to the isotropic
heat diffusion equation It = c∆I if c(x, y, t) is a con-
stant. Suppose that at time T , we knew the locations of
the region boundaries or edges for that scale. We want to
encourage a region to be smooth in preference to smooth-
ing across the boundaries. We could achieve this by set-
ting the conduction coefficient to be 1 in the interior of
each region and 0 at the boundaries. The blurring would
then take place separately in each region with no inter-
action between regions and the region boundaries would
remain sharp.
The next task is to localize the region boundaries at
each scale. Perona et al. [20] compute the best estimate
of the location of the boundaries appropriate to that scale.
Let E(x, y, t) be such an estimate, the conduction coeffi-
cient c(x, y, t) can be chosen to be a function c = g(||E||)
of the magnitude of E. E = 0 means the points are in the
interior of a region and in other cases means the points are
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at the edge. Specially, if the function g(.) is chosen prop-
erly, the diffusion in which the conduction coefficient is
chosen locally as a function of the magnitude of the gra-
dient of the brightness function, i.e.,
c(x, y, t) = g(||∇I(x, y, t)||) (2)
will not only preserve, but also sharpen the brightness
edges.
3.1.1 Edge Enhancement
The blurring of edges is the main price paid for eliminat-
ing the noise with conventional low-pass filtering and lin-
ear diffusion. It will be difficult to detect and localize the
region boundaries. Edge enhancement and reconstruction
of blurry images can be obtained by high-pass filtering or
running the diffusion equation backwards in time. If the
conduction coefficient is chosen to be an appropriate func-
tion of the image gradient, we can make the anisotropic
diffusion enhance edges while running forward in time,
thus ensuring the stability of diffusions.
The model make the edge as a step function convolved
with a Gaussian kernel. Without loss of generality, as-
sume that the edge is aligned with the y axis.
The expression for the divergence operator simplifies
to
div(c(x, y, t)∇I) = ∂
∂x
(c(x, y, t)Ix). (3)
We choose c to be a function of the gradient of I : c(x,
y, t) = g(Ix(x, y, t)) as in Eq.(2). Let φ(Ix)
.
= g(Ix) · Ix
denote the flux c · Ix.
Then the 1-D version of the Eq.(1) is
It =
∂
∂x
φ(Ix) = φ
′(Ix) · Ixx. (4)
The variation of the edge slope is ∂/∂t(Ix). If c(·) > 0,
the function I(·) is smooth, and the order of differentia-
tion may be inverted as
∂
∂t
(Ix) =
∂
∂x
(It) =
∂
∂x
(
∂
∂x
φ(Ix)
)
= φ′′ · I2xx + φ′ · Ixxx.
(5)
Suppose the edge is oriented as Ix > 0. At the
point of inflection Ixx = 0, and Ixxx << 0 since the
point of inflection corresponds to the point with maxi-
mum slope. Then in a neighborhood of the point of inflec-
tion ∂/∂t(Ix) has sign opposite to φ
′
(Ix). If φ
′
(Ix) > 0
the edge slope will decrease with time, on the contrary
φ
′
(Ix) < 0 the slope will increase with time. Based on
the increase of the slope, the edge becomes sharper.
3.1.2 Diffusion Scheme
The anisotropic diffusion and edge detection method [20]
we utilized is a simple numerical scheme that is described
in this section.
Eq.(1) can be discretized on a square lattice with bright-
ness values associated to the vertices, and conduction co-
efficients to the arcs. A 4-nearest neighbors discretization
of the Laplacian operator can be given by
IL+1i,j = I
L
i,j + λ[cN · 5NI + cS · 5SI
+ cE · 5EI + cW · 5W I]Li,j
(6)
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1/4 for the numerical scheme to be sta-
ble, N , S, E, W are the mnemonic subscripts for North,
South, East, West. The symbol 5 indicates nearest-
neighbor differences:
5N Ii,j ≡ Ii−1,j − Ii,j
5S Ii,j ≡ Ii+1,j − Ii,j
5E Ii,j ≡ Ii,j+1 − Ii,j
5W Ii,j ≡ Ii,j−1 − Ii,j .
(7)
In some directions, if the difference is obviously, it in-
dicates that this point may at the edge and we should pre-
serve and sharpen the edge information. Figure 3 shows
the overall scheme to detect the edges and preserve them.
The value of the gradient can be computed by
cLNi,j = g(| 5N ILi,j |)
cLSi,j = g(| 5S ILi,j |)
cLEi,j = g(| 5E ILi,j |)
cLWi,j = g(| 5W ILi,j |).
(8)
If the 5 in some directions change greater, the value
of the c(·) should be smaller, and thus will preserve and
sharpen the boundary locations.
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Figure 3: (a) Original image. (b) Diffused image. The
point in red circle is similar with its nearest-neighbors that
indicates this point is in the interior of a region. The point
in green circle has distinct differences with its nearest-
neighbors that indicates this point is at the edge.
In this scheme, the conduction tensor in the diffusion
equation is diagonal with entries g(|Ix|) and g(|Iy|) in-
stead of g(||∇I||) and g(||∇I||). This diffusion scheme
preserves the property of the continuous Eq.(1) that the
total amount of brightness in the image is preserved.
3.2 Kernel Matrix
Kernel matrix has recently received increasing attention
as a generic feature representation in various recognition
and classification tasks. For a large set of kernel func-
tions, the kernel matrix is guaranteed to be nonsingular,
even if samples are scarce. More importantly, kernel ma-
trix gives us unlimited opportunities to model nonlinear
feature relationship in an efficient manner.
3.2.1 Feature Representation
We use the kernel matrix, M, as a generic feature repre-
sentation [27]. The (i, j) th entry of M is defined as
ki,j =< φ(fi), φ(fj) >= κ(fi, fj), (9)
where φ(·) is an implicit nonlinear mapping and κ(·, ·) is
the induced kernel function. The mapping κ(·, ·) is ap-
plied to each feature fi, rather than to each sample xi
as usually seen in kernel-based learning methods. The
most significant advantage of using M is that we can have
much more flexibility to efficiently model the nonlinear
relationship among features.
We can evaluate the similarity of feature distributions
by some specific kernels like Bhattacharyya kernel [12].
When we do not know beforehand what kind of nonlinear
relationship shall be modeled, we can apply a kernel rep-
resentation. In this case, any general purpose kernel, such
as the Gaussian RBF kernel
κ(fi, fj) = exp(−γ||fi − fj ||2) (10)
can be employed. Also, once it becomes necessary, users
are free to design new, specific kernels to serve their goals.
Using a kernel matrix as feature representation is so flexi-
ble for us to model the relationship between different fea-
tures.
In relation to the singularity issue, kernel matrix also
has its advantages. When d ≥ n is true, where d is
the number of the features and n is the dimension of
them, some feature representation like covariance matrix
is bound to be singular. In contrast, kernel matrix can han-
dle this situation well. A direct application of Micchellis
Theorem [8] gives the following result for this case.
Theorem 1. Let f1, f2, · · ·, fd be a set of different n-
dimensional vectors. The matrix Md×d computed with a
RBF kernel κ(fi, fj) = exp(−γ||fi−fj ||2) is guaranteed
to be nonsingular, no matter what values d and n are.
According to Micchellis Theorem, the RBF kernel also
satisfies the above theorem to ensure the nonsingularity
of D-K features. The presence of the kernel matrix as fea-
ture representation provides us great freedom to choose
the most appropriate one for a kernel representation.
3.2.2 Kernel Function
To reduce the computational complexity, we use the com-
monly used RBF kernel Eq.(10) as the kernel of our ma-
trix for its superior properties. Given n d-dimensional
vectors, x1, · · ·, xn, computing all the entries ||fi −
fj ||2(i, j = 1, ···, d) has the complexity ofO(nd2). In ad-
dition, the proposed kernel representation based on RBF
kernel could be quickly computed via integral images.
Noting that ||fi − fj ||2 = f>i fi − 2f>i fj + f>j fj , we
can precompute d2 integral images for the inner product
of any two feature dimensions.
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Generally, the availability of more samples makes ker-
nel evaluation more reliable. In RBF kernel function,
more samples make the parameters converge towards their
true values. However, in practice we are constrained by
the number of available training samples. Also, the pro-
posed kernel matrix has a fixed size (d× d), independent
of the number of samples (n) in a set. Due to this, the
kernel-based representations obtained from two different-
sized sets can be directly compared.
3.3 Diffusion-kernel (D-K) Features
The ADKMM includes two processes. First, we input the
face video clip Co or images Io, the anisotropic diffusion
method diffuse the input Co or Io to enhance edge infor-
mation. After several diffusion iterations, the edge of the
face images will be preserved and become sharper. From
the diffused video clip Cdif or images Idif , we can ob-
tain more depth information and boundary locations of
face images.
Next, we extract D-K features from these diffused face
video clip Cdif . As we use the RBF kernel Eq.(10) as the
kernel function, our model is defined as
f = κ(Cdif , Cdif ) = exp(−γ||Cdif − Cdif ||2). (11)
We vectorize pixel values of each frame of Cdif as a col-
umn vector, and the video clip Cdif is represented as a
matrix Md×n, where d is the dimension of the images
and n is the number of the frames. Since the dimension
d of the matrix is so high that will cost huge computing
resource and time, we then reduce the dimension as lowd.
After the dimensionality reduction of every frame, the
matrix Md×n which represent the diffused face video clip
Cdif becomes Mlowd×n. Then we input the low dimen-
sion matrix as the representation of Cdif into the model
and gain a Mlowd×lowd D-K feature. The D-K features
can guide to distinguish fake face images from real one
effectively since they reflect the inner correlation of se-
quential face images like Cdif .
3.4 Deep Features
Deep learning algorithms have been successfully applied
in several vision tasks such as face detection [7] and face
recognition [14]. CNNs are designed to extract the lo-
cal features by combining three architectural concepts that
perform some degree of shift, scale, distortion invariance,
local receptive fields, shared weight and subsampling.
The ability of both convolution layers and subsampling
layers to learn distinctive features from the diffused image
helps to extract features and achieve better performance
for face liveness detection.
The CNN is pre-trained on the several datasets which
totally has more than 500 thousand images of 80 clients
to obtain good initializations. The pre-trained model we
used is the AlexNet [13] for its impressive performance.
The AlexNet contains convolutional layers, normalization
layers, linear layers, ReLU activation layers, and max-
pooling layers. For simplicity, we use L1-5 to represent
the 5 convolutional layers, and L6-8 describe the 3 lin-
ear layers. The L3-5 are connected to one another with-
out any intervening pooling or normalization layers. The
fully-connected layers L6-8 have 4096 neurons each. The
L6-7 output features with the dimension of 4096, and the
dimensionality of features in L8 is 1000. The L8 is fol-
lowed by a softmatx classifier to generate probability dis-
tribution for classification. Previous studies [13, 17] show
that the 4096-dimensional features of L7 perform better
than many handcrafted features. In our network, the L1-
7 layers are used as the feature extractor, and we use the
4096-dimensional features of L7 as the deep features.
As mentioned above, whether the input is a face image
Io or a video clipCo, the ADKMM can diffuse and extract
the D-K features from them. When the input is a video
clipCo, we randomly select a frame to represent the whole
video clip. We assume that the deep feature of this image
frame can represent the deep feature of input video clip
Co.
3.5 Generalized Multiple Kernel Learning
Multiple kernel learning refers to a set of machine learn-
ing methods that use a predefined set of kernels and learn
an optimal linear or non-linear combination of kernels as
part of the algorithm. Multiple kernel learning method
has the ability to select for an optimal kernel and param-
eters from a larger set of kernels, reducing bias due to
kernel selection while allowing for more automated ma-
chine learning methods. Instead of creating a new kernel,
multiple kernel algorithms can be used to combine kernels
already established for each individual data source.
Given training one kind of features {xi|i = 1, 2, ···, N}
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Figure 4: Samples from the NUAA dataset (upper row:
live faces; lower row: fake faces).
Figure 5: Samples from the Replay-Attack dataset (upper
row: live faces; lower row: fake faces).
and the other kind of features {yi|i = 1, 2, · · ·, N}, the
generalized multiple kernel learning is used to fuse these
two kinds of training features and train multiple binary
classifiers for face liveness detection. The decision func-
tion is given by
f(x, y) = c1w
T
1 φ1(x) + c2w
T
2 φ(y) + b, (12)
where c1 and c2 are the combination coefficients of the
two kinds of features with the constraints that c1 + c2 = 1
and c1, c2 ≥ 0, w and b are parameters of the standard
SVM, and ϕ(·) is the a function mapping those two kinds
of features to high dimensional space. c, w and b are
learned by solving
min
w,b,c
1
2
2∑
t=1
(
ct||wt||2 + c2t
)
+ C
N∑
i
l(pi, f(xi, yi))
s.t. c1 + c2 = 1, c1, c2 ≥ 0,
(13)
where l(pi, f(xi, yi)) = max(0, 1 − pif(xi, yi)) is the
loss function, and pi = {+1,−1} is the label of the i-th
training sample. Similar to [26], Eq.(12) can be reformu-
lated by replacing the SVM with its dual form:
min
c
1
2
(c21 + c
2
2) + J(c1, c2)
s.t. c1 + c2 = 1, c1, c2 ≥ 0,
(14)
where
J(c1, c2) =
max
α
N∑
i=1
α1 − 1
2
N∑
i,j=1
αiαjpipj(c1k1(xi, xj) + c2k2(yi, yj))
s.t.
N∑
i1
αipi = 0, 0 ≤ αi ≤ C, i = 1, 2, · · ·, N,
(15)
α is the dual variable, k1(·, ·) and k2(·, ·) are kernel func-
tions for two kinds of training features, respectively. Here,
the RBF kernel function k1(xi, xj) = exp(−γ||xi −
xj ||2)and the linear kernel function k2(yi, yj) = yTi yj
are used, where γ > 0 is the kernel parameter. Following
[26], Eq.(13) is solved by iteratively updating the linear
combination coefficients c and the dual variable α.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we perform an extensive experimental
evaluation on various datasets to validate the effectiveness
and the superiority of our method. We first introduce two
benchmark datasets: the NUAA dataset and the Replay-
Attack dataset. Then, we give the detailed description of
parameter choices for the ADKMM and generalized mul-
tiple kernel learning method. Finally, we compare our
method with a number of face liveness detection meth-
ods and demonstrate the outstanding performance of the
proposed method.
4.1 Datasets
NUAA: The NUAA dataset [24] is publicly available and
the most widely adopted benchmark for the evaluation
of face liveness detection. The database images consist
of 15 different clients which provide 12,614 images of
both live and photographed faces. These images were
resized to 64 × 64 pixels with gray-scale representation.
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Iteration numbers (L) Accuracy
5 94.2%
10 98.7%
15 99.3%
20 96.5%
25 93.1%
30 90.6%
Table 1: Performance with different iteration numbers (L)
on the NUAA dataset.
Methods Accuracy
Ours 99.3%
ND-CNN [1] 99.0%
DS-LSP [9] 98.5%
CDD [28] 97.7%
DoG-SL [19] 94.5%
M-LBP [16] 92.7%
DoG-LRBLR [24] 87.5%
DoG-F [15] 84.5%
DoG-M [29] 81.8%
Table 2: Performance comparison on the NUAA dataset
with other methods.
Some samples of the NUAA dataset are shown in Figure
4. For the training set, a total of 3,491 images (live:1,743 /
fake:1,748) were selected, while the testing set was com-
posed of 9,123 images (live:3,362 / fake:5,761).
Replay-Attack: The Replay-Attack dataset [6] was re-
leased in 2012 and is publicly available and widely used.
It consists of 1,300 video clips of 50 different subjects.
These video clips are divided into 300 real-access videos
and 1000 spoofing attack videos which the resolution is
320 × 240 pixels. The dataset takes into consideration
the different lighting conditions used in spoofing attacks.
Some samples of the Replay-Attack dataset are shown in
Figure 5. Note that the Replay-Attack database is divided
into three subsets: training, development and testing.
4.2 Parameter Settings
All parameters of our method are found experimentally
and remain unchanged for all datasets. In our anisotropic
diffusion scheme, we use c(·) = exp(− 5 /K2) as the
the gradient value function and the constant K was fixed
as 15. We fixed the λ = 0.15 in Eq.(6). In our generalized
multiple kernel learning method, the combination coeffi-
cients c1, c2 are initialized as 1/2. Since the face liveness
detection is a binary classification problem, parameter λ
in the RBF kernel function k1(xi, xj) is fixed as 1/2.
4.3 Performance Evaluation on the NUAA
Dataset
We evaluate the performance of our approach on the
NUAA dataset and conducted many experiments with dif-
ferent iteration numbers (L) in Eq.(6) as shown in Table
1. The best detection accuracy achieved using the NUAA
dataset was 99.3% using value of L = 15. From Table
1, we can see that increase the number of iterations does
not always lead to higher accuracy. For example, exper-
iments where L = 10 resulted in the accuracy of 98.7%,
and experiments where L = 25 resulted in an accuracy of
93.1%.
To prove the effectiveness and superiority of the pro-
posed method, we compared the performance of our ap-
proach with all previously proposed approaches on the
NUAA dataset.
The compared approaches include multiple difference
of Gaussian (DoG-M) [29], DoG and high frequency-
based (DoG-F) [15], DoG-sparse low-rank bilinear lo-
gistic regression (DoG-LRBLR) [24], multiple local bi-
nary pattern (M-LBP) [16], DoG-sparse logistic (DoG-
SL) [19], component-dependent descriptor (CDD) [28],
diffused speed-local speed pattern (DS-LSP) [9] and non-
linear diffusion based convolution neural network (ND-
CNN) [1]. Owing to the strong performance of the AD-
KMM, our method can model the differences between
live and fake faces efficiently. As shown in Table 2, our
method achieves the best performance with an accuracy
of 99.3% beyond the previous approaches.
4.4 Performance Evaluation on the Replay-
Attack Dataset
We describe our performance evaluation on the Replay-
Attack dataset, which is designed specifically for face
spoofing studies and contains diverse spoofing attacks as
well. We employed L = 15 for our ADKMM achiev-
ing the best performance on the NUAA dataset. Besides
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Methods devel test
LBPu23×3 + x
2 [6] 31.24% 34.01%
LBPu23×3+LDA [6] 19.60% 17.17%
LBPu23×3+SVM [6] 14.84% 15.16%
LBP+SVM [16] 13.90% 13.87%
DS-LBP [9] 13.73% 12.50%
ND-CNN [1] – 10%
Ours 5.16% 4.30%
Table 3: Performance comparison using HTER measure
on the Replay-Attack dataset.
training and testing samples, the Replay-Attack dataset
also provides development samples to efficiently evalu-
ate the performance of anti-spoofing methods. For ac-
curately measure the performance on the Replay-Attack
dataset, we computed the half total error rate (HTER) [4]
to measure the performance of our proposed approach.
The HTER is half of the sum of the false rejection rate
(FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR):
HTER =
FRR+ FAR
2
A performance comparison with previously proposed
methods is shown in Table 3. On ReplayAttack-test set,
the HTER of our method is 4.30% and our HTER is
5.16% on ReplayAttack-devel set. From table 3, we can
know that the HTER of our method is better than that of
LBP-based methods [6, 16]. It indicates that the AD-
KMM can evidently estimate the difference in surface
properties between live and fake face images. The re-
sult of our method is also better than other diffusion-based
methods [9, 1] which indicates the D-K features also have
the ability to reflect the difference between face image se-
quences in inner correlation. The detail results shown in
Table 3 confirm that the proposed method with ADKMM
achieves an impressive accuracy under various types of
spoofing attacks as compared to previous approaches.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented an anisotropic diffusion-
based kernel model (ADKMM) for face liveness detec-
tion. The anisotropic diffusion method helps to enhance
edge information and boundary locations of face images.
Diffusion-kernel (D-K) features extracted from these im-
ages can significantly represent the differences in surface
properties and inner correlation between live and fake face
images. The D-K features and the deep features are fused
by a generalized multiple kernel learning method, thus
achieves excellent performance against face spoofing at-
tack. The ADKMM allows us to detect face liveness even
under different lighting conditions usually used in attack
attempts. Experimental results compared with other face
liveness methods show the superiority and outstanding
performance of our method.
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